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Abstract. Starting with the neo-Bayesian revival of the 1950s, many
statisticians argued that it was inappropriate to use Bayesian meth-
ods, and in particular subjective Bayesian methods in governmental
and public policy settings because of their reliance upon prior distribu-
tions. But the Bayesian framework often provides the primary way to
respond to questions raised in these settings and the numbers and di-
versity of Bayesian applications has grown dramatically in recent years.
Through a series of examples, both historical and recent, we argue that
Bayesian approaches with formal and informal assessments of priors
AND likelihood functions are well-accepted and should become the
norm in public settings. Our examples include censustaking and small
area estimation, U.S. election night forecasting, studies reported to the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, assessing global climate change,
and measuring potential declines in disability among the elderly.
AMS 2000 subject classications: Primary 62F15, 90.03; secondary 62P12,
62P25, 62P99.
Key words and phrases: census adjustment, condentiality, disability
measurement, election night forecasting, Bayesian clinical drug studies,
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1. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY
Beginning with the posthumous publication in 1763 of the essay attributed to
the Rev. Thomas Bayes, and continuing well into the twentieth century virtually
the only approach to statistical inference was the method of inverse probability
based on applications of Bayes' theorem, e.g., see Fienberg (2006a). Nonethe-
less, most applications of statistical methods in governmental settings were based
primarily on descriptive statistics and there was little debate regarding the rele-
vance of Bayesian approaches in public life despite eorts at implementation, e.g.,
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Laplace's development of ratio estimation to estimate the size of the population
of France.
Criticism of the method of inverse probability, as Bayesian methodology was
known for almost 200 years, began in the mid-19th century with the rise of a
philosophical school advocating objective probability. The fundamental concern
of the objectivists was the requirement for a prior distribution and they argued for
a frequentist view of probability. Unfortunately they failed to present a method-
ology for inference to counter that of inverse probability and it was not until the
work of R.A. Fisher and Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson in the 1920s that seri-
ous alternative statistical procedures were in place. Neyman's (1934) critique of
Gini's version of the representative method for survey taking not only ushered in
the frequentist repeated sampling perspective into the realm of ocial statistics,
but it also introduced the frequentist tool of condence intervals and its long-run
repeated sampling interpretation (see Fienberg and Tanur, 1996).
Bayesian tools played an important role in a number of statistical eorts dur-
ing WWII, including Alan Turing's work at Bletchley Park, England to crack
the Enigma code, but with the creation of such frequentist methods as sequen-
tial analysis by Barnard in England and Wald in the United States and the
elaboration of design-based analyses in sample surveys, as statistics passed the
mid-century mark, frequentist approaches were in the ascendancy in the public
arena. This was especially true in statistical agencies where the ideas of random
selection of samples and repeated sampling as the basis of inference were syn-
onymous, and statistical models and likelihood-based methods frowned upon at
best.
With the introduction of computers for statistical calculations in the 1960s,
however, Bayesian methods began a slow but prolonged comeback that acceler-
ated substantially with the introduction of Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC)
methods in the early 1990s. Today Bayesian methods are challenging the supremacy
of the frequentist approaches in a wide array of areas of application.
How do the approaches dier? In frequentist inference, tests of signicance
are performed by supposing that a hypothesis is true (the null hypothesis) and
then computing the probability of observing a statistic at least as extreme as
the one actually observed during hypothetical future repeated trials conditional
on the parameters, i.e., a p-value. Bayesian inference relies upon direct infer-
ences about parameters or predictions conditional on the observations. In other
words, frequentist statistics examines the probability of the data given a model
(hypothesis) and looks at repeated sampling properties of a procedure, whereas
Bayesian statistics examines the probability of a model given the observed data.
Bayesian methodology relies largely upon Bayes' theorem for computing poste-
rior probabilities and provides an internally consistent and coherent normative
methodology; frequentist methodology has no such consistent normative frame-
work. Freedman (1995) gives an overview of these philosophical positions, but
largely from a frequentist perspective that is critical of the Bayesian normative
approach.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. In the next section
I give a summary of some of the most common and cogent criticisms of the
Bayesian method, especially with regard to its use in a public context. Then in
Section 3, through a series of examples, both historical and recent, I argue that
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Bayesian approaches with formal and informal assessments of priors AND likeli-
hood functions are well-accepted and should become the norm in public settings.
My examples include U.S. election night forecasting, census-taking and small area
estimation, studies reported to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, assessing
global climate change, and measuring declines in disability among the elderly. We
conclude with a brief summary of challenges facing broader implementation of
Bayesian methods in public contexts.
I do not claim to be providing a comprehensive account of Bayesian appli-
cations but have merely attempted to illustrate their breadth. One area where
Bayesian ideas have made serious inroads, both in theory and in actual prac-
tice, but which we do not discuss here is the law, e.g., see Fienberg and Kadane
(1983), Donnelly (2005), Taroni et al. (2006), and Kadane (2008). The present
paper includes a purposeful selection of references to guide the reader to some of
the relevant recent Bayesian literature on applications in the domains mentioned,
but the list is far from comprehensive and tends to emphasize work closest to my
own.
2. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE USE OF BAYESIAN
METHODS
Bayesian and frequentist inference in a nutshell: It is especially convenient for
the present purposes to think about Bayes' theorem in terms of density func-
tions. Let h(yj) denote the conditional density of the random variable Y given
a parameter value  in the parameter space . Then we can go from the prior
distribution for , g() to that associated with  given Y = y, g(jy), by
g(jy) = h(yj)g()=
X
2
h(yj)g() if  has a discrete distribution; (1)
g(jy) = h(yj)g()=
Z

h(yj)g()d if  has a continuous distribution: (2)
Bayesians make inferences about the parameters by looking directly at the pos-
terior distribution g(jy) given the data y. Frequentists make inferences about 
indirectly by considering the repeated sampling properties of the distribution of
the data y given the parameter , i.e., through h(yj). Bayesians integrate out
quantities not of direct substantive interest and then are able to make proba-
bilistic inferences from marginal distributions. Most frequentists use some form
of conditioning argument for inference purposes while others maximize likeli-
hood functions. Frequentists distinguish between random variables and parame-
ters which they take to be xed and this leads to linear mixed models where some
of the eects are xed, i.e., are parameters, and some are random variables. For a
Bayesian all linear models are in essence random eects models since parameters
are themselves considered as random variables. Thus it is natural for a Bayesian
to consider them to be independent draws from a common distribution, g(),
i.e., treating them as exchangeable following the original argument of de Finetti
(1937). This approach leads naturally to putting distributions on the parameters
of prior distributions and to what we now call the hierarchical Bayesian model.
It is the normalizing constants (the denominators of equations (1) and (2)) that
are notoriously dicult to compute and this fact has led, in large part, to the
use of MCMC methods such as Gibbs sampling that involve sampling from the
posterior distribution.
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A reviewer of an earlier version of this paper suggested that hierarchical models
are really not Bayesian, unless one puts a prior at the top level of the hierarchy.
This ignores history. As Good (1965) notes, his own use of such ideas draws
on ideas dating back at least to the 1920s and the work of W.E. Johnson whose
`sucientness' postulate implicitly used nite exchangeable sequences. And while
non-Bayesians came to recognize the power of such structures many decades later
they did attempt to emulate the Bayesian approach, but of course without the
clean Bayesian probabilistic interpretation.
Critique of the Bayesian perspective: The most common criticism of Bayesian
methods is that, since there is no single correct prior distribution, g(), all con-
clusions drawn from the posterior distribution are suspect. One counter to this
argument is that published analyses using Bayesian methods should consider and
report the results associated with a variety of prior distributions, thus allowing
the reader to see the eects of dierent prior beliefs on the posterior distribution
of a parameter. Others argue that one should choose as a prior distribution one
that in some sense eliminates personal subjectivity. Examples of such \objective"
priors are those that are uniform or diuse across all possible values of the pa-
rameter, or those that are \informationless." Berger (2006) and Goldstein (2006)
present arguments in favor of the objective and subjective Bayesian approaches
in a forum followed by extensive discussion. For a discussion of the fruitlessness
of the search for an objective and informationless prior, see Fienberg (2006b).
There are a number of other features associated with the subjective approach
including the elicitation of information for the formulation of prior distributions
and the use of exchangeability in the development of successive layers of hierar-
chical models. A number of the examples described in the sections that follow
utilize subjective Bayesian features although not always with full elicitation.
One characteristic of Bayesian inference that weakens this criticism of the
reliance on the prior distribution is that the more data we collect, the less inuence
the prior distribution has on the posterior distribution relative to that of the data.
There are situations, however, where even an innite amount of data may not
bring two people into agreement, e.g., see Diaconis and Freedman (1986).
Another aspect of the Bayesian methodology that arises in many applications
is the manner in which it \borrows strength" when we are estimating many
parameters simultaneously, especially through the use of hierarchical models. This
feature which is usually viewed as a virtue has also been the focal point of criticism
by frequentists. For example, see the commentary by Freedman and Navidi (1986)
in the context of census adjustment who critiqued a Bayesian methodology at
least in part because it resulted to the use of data from one state to adjust
the census-based population gures in other ones. Today, borrowing strength via
cross-area regression models is common in frequentist circles, and the Freedman-
Navidi argument thus takes on a non-statistical legal issue rather than a statistical
one.
For an interesting dialog on dierent frequentist perspectives related to sta-
tistical inference, see the discussion paper by a group of frequentist statisticians
at Groningen University in the Netherlands, Kardaun et al. (2003), which was
a response to a series of questions posed by David Cox following a lecture at
Groningen. As someone else has noted, it is a rare occasion where frequentists
seriously entertain ideas such as those extolled by de Finetti (1937) and attempt
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to reject them. A number of the questions discussed in this paper arise in the
context of the examples that follow.
3. SMALL AREA ESTIMATION AND CENSUS ADJUSTMENT
Small area estimation: As we have already intimated, small area estimation
has been a ripe area for Bayesian methods although because so much of the lit-
erature has been oriented towards national statistical agency problems, the area
is dominated by frequentist techniques and assessments. Surveys conducted by
national statistical agencies typically generate \reliable" information either at
national or regional levels. But the demand for information at lower levels of
disaggregation is suciently great and resources tend to be relatively scarce, so
that techniques that bolster the sparsity of data at the lower level of disaggrega-
tion with data from other sources or from other areas or domains are essential to
getting estimates with relatively small standard errors.
The big question is with respect to what distribution are the standard er-
rors computed. There are three dierent answers depending on one's perspective.
Sampling statisticians most often with to take expectations with respect to the
random structure in the sampling design. At the other extreme are Bayesians for
whom the variability is an inherent part of the stochastic model structure for
the phenomenon of interest, e.g., unemployment or crime. And in the middle, are
model-based likelihood statisticians. My argument is that in the context of small
area estimation the design-based statisticians were singularly unsuccessful until
they emulated Bayesian ideas of smoothing and borrowing strength, but even
then they have insisted on averaging with respect to the sampling design, with
arguments about robustness of results.
Jiang and Lahiri (2006) suggest that the problem goes back almost a millen-
nium to the eleventh century, but interest in formal statistical estimation for small
areas is a relatively recent phenomenon and much of the recent literature can be
traced to a seminal paper by Fay and Herriot (1979) who used the James-Stein
\shrinkage" estimation ideas to carry out small area estimation in a frequen-
tist manner. Given the close relationship between such techniques and empirical
Bayesian estimation, e.g., see Efron and Morris (1973), and mixed linear models,
it is a relatively small leap to the use of fully Bayesian methodology. But the
evolution towards such methodology documented by Jiang and Lahiri has been
relatively slow and marked by a general resistance in statistical agencies to use
models to begin with let alone Bayesian formulations, e.g., see the descriptions
of small area estimation methodology in the book by Rao (2003), and contrast it
with the Bayesian hierarchical formulations in Ballin et al. (2005) and Trevisani
and Torelli (2004).
Census adjustment: What is remarkable about the ascendency of the small area
estimation methodology in the United States, is that many of those who argued
for its use opposed the use of essentially the same ideas for census adjustment for
dierential undercount in the 1980s and 1990s. The basic component of census
adjustment in these debates was the use of the now standard capture-recapture
methodology for population estimation, e.g., see Bishop, Fienberg, and Holland
(1975, Chapter 6), methodology that has its roots in Laplace's method of ratio
estimation. Because a second count (the recapture) in a census context cannot
reasonably be done for the nation as a whole, methods that utilize a sample of
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individuals were introduced in 1950 and to get small area estimates of popula-
tion, i.e., for every block in the nation, Ericksen and Kadane (1985) proposed
the use of a Bayesian regression model for smoothing. Being fully Bayesian was
especially important because of the sparseness of the data at their disposal for
adjustment, based on a sample from the Current Population Survey. As we noted
above, Freedman and Navidi (1986) opposed the use of this methodology as did
Fay and Herriot's colleagues at the U.S. Census Bureau, at least in part on its use
of models with unveriable assumptions, and precisely because the shrinkage ap-
proach embedded in the methodology borrowed strength across state boundaries
to get suciently tight estimates of error.
Ericksen, Kadane, and Tukey (1989) present a more rened version of the
technical arguments looking back to the 1980 census, as well as ahead to the
1990 census. For the 1990 census, the U.S. Census Bureau essentially proposed
the use of a frequentist approach that had similar structure, at least in spirit,
to that proposed for 1980, and this was possible only by increasing the size of
the sample used for adjustment purposes by an order of magnitude. This plan
was opposed largely on political grounds as well as by Freedman and colleagues
who continued to object to the role of statistical models in the estimation pro-
cedure. A similar controversy ensued as planning for the 2000 census progressed
with components for adjustment as well as sampling for non-response followup,
and ultimately the Supreme Court stepped in and interpreted the census act as
banning the use of sampling for this purpose. Anderson and Fienberg (1999) and
Anderson et al. (2000) provide extensive details on the 1990 and 2000 adjustment
controversies. While American politicians have eschewed the use of Bayesian and
non-Bayesian adjustment techniques, statistical agencies in several other coun-
tries, such asArgentina, Australia, and the United Kingdom, have implemented
similar methodology, although with little emphasis on its Bayesian motivation.
4. ELECTION NIGHT FORECASTING
In the U.S. the use of statistical forecasting of election outcomes based on early
reported returns began in the early 1950s. The CBS television network employed
one of the early computers, the UNIVAC, and the statistician Max Woodbury de-
veloped a regression style model that was used successfully to predict the outcome
of the 1952 presidential election. By 1960, computers had become a major tool
of the U.S. television networks in support of their election night coverage. Every-
thing was based in some form or another on the 150,000+ precincts where votes
were cast across the U.S., and attention focused on subsets of \key" precincts,
chosen in dierent ways by the three major networks, and on early access to
precinct results. The following description draws upon that in Fienberg (2007).
In 1960, the RCA Corporation which owned the NBC television network hired
CEIR, a statistical consulting rm, to develop a rapid election night projection
procedure. CEIR consultants included Max Woodbury, and a number of others
including John Tukey. Computers were still large, expensive, and slow and much
of what Max Woodbury had done for CBS still had to be done by hand. Data of
several types were available: past history (at various levels, e.g., county), results
of polls preceding the election, political scientists' predictions, partial county
returns owing in during the evening, and complete results for selected precincts.
The data of the analyses were, in many cases, swings from sets of base values
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derived from past results and from political scientists' opinions. It turned out
that the important problem of projecting turnout was more dicult than that of
projecting candidate percentage. Starting with the 1962 congressional election,
Tukey assembled a statistical team to develop the required methodology and to
analyze the results as they owed in on election night. Early members of the team
included Bob Abelson, David Brillinger, Dick Link, John Mauchly, and David
Wallace who joined for the 1964 primaries. From 1962 through 1966, they were
consultants to RCA and they interacted with the political scientists and one-time
Census Bureau ocial Richard Scammon who had his own methodology using a
collection of key precinct results.
David Brillinger (2002) recalls: \Tukey sought `improved' estimates. His ter-
minology was that the problem was one of `borrowing strength.'" There is a
remarkably close resemblance between this methodology and that used for small
area estimation. The novel feature in the election night context comes from the
nature of the sparsity|because estimation was based on early reported returns.
The methodology is now recognizable as hierarchical Bayesian with the use of
empirical Bayesian techniques at the top level. Data owed in with observations
at the precinct (polling place) level and were aggregated to county level, and
then to the state as a whole. Subjective judgment was used in the choice of the
subsets of \key" precincts and prior distributions were typically based on the
results of prior state elections with the choice being made subjectively to capture
the political scientists' best judgment about which past election most closely re-
sembled the election at hand. As early returns arrived at the computing central
command facility, a team of statisticians reviewed the actual distribution of early
returns across the state to check for anomalies in light of special circumstances
and political practices.
And estimates that really mattered were those at the state level since the
model was used for statewide elections for governor and senate positions as well
as for presidential elections where state outcomes play a crucial role. Two models
were used: one for projecting turnout and the other for projecting the actual
percentage dierence (\swing") between Democratic and Republican candidates.
The occasional rise of serious independent candidates led to model extensions
and empirical complications.
Brillinger goes on to note: \Jargon was developed; for example, there were
`barometric' and `swing-o-metric' precinct samples. The procedures developed can
be described as an early example of empirical Bayes. The uncertainties, developed
on a dierent basis, were just as important as the point estimates." The variance
calculations appeared nowhere in the statistical literature and thus they had to
be derived and veried by members of the team. This was at about the same
time as David Wallace was working with Frederick Mosteller on their landmark
Bayesian study of the The Federalist Papers, which was published in 1964. Tukey's
attitude to release of the techniques developed is worth commenting on. Brillinger
recounts how, on various occasions, members of his \team" were asked to give
talks and write papers describing the work. When Tukey's permission was sought,
his remark was invariably that it was \too soon" and that the techniques were
\proprietary" to RCA and NBC. With Tukey's death in 2002, we may well have
lost the opportunity to learn all of the technical details of the work done 40 years
earlier.
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Tukey's students and his collaborators began to use related ideas on \borrowing
strength," e.g., in the National Halothane Study of anesthetics (Bunker et al.,
1969) and for the analysis of contingency table data, e.g., see Bishop, Fienberg,
and Holland (1975). All of this before the methodology was described in somewhat
dierent form by I.J. Good in his 1965 book and christened as \hierarchical
Bayes" in the classic 1972 paper by Dennis Lindley and Adrian Smith. The specic
version of hierarchical Bayes in the election night model remained unpublished,
although in an ironic twist, something close to it appeared in a paper written
by one of David Wallace's former students, Alastair Scott, and a colleague Fred
Smith (1969, 1971), who were unaware of any of the details of Wallace's work
for NBC and who developed their approach for dierent purposes! Several other
hierarchical Bayesian election night forecasting models have now been used in
other countries, e.g., see Brown et al. (1997) and Bernardo and Gir on (1992).
The methods described here were in use at NBC through the 1980 presidential
elections. Other networks used dierent methodology and the statisticians who
worked for the Tukey team were quite proud of their record of early and more ac-
curate calls of winners than those made by the other networks, especially in close
elections. With Reagan's landslide presidential victory in 1980, the results were
seemingly better captured by exit polls and from 1982 onwards NBC switched
to the use of exit polls in competition and then in collaboration with the other
television networks. See Fienberg (2007) for further details and a number of the
recent controversies regarding exit poll forecasting and reporting.
5. BAYESIAN METHODOLOGY AND THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION
Traditional randomized clinical trials, evaluated with frequentist methodology,
have long been viewed as the bedrock of the drug and device approval system at
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Over the past couple of decades
the drug companies and some members of the U.S. Congress have been critical
of the the lengthy FDA review processes that have resulted and the enormous
expense associated with bringing drugs and medical devices to market. The sta-
tistical literature has also produced Bayesian randomized design alternatives,
e.g., see Spiegelhalter et al. (1994), Berry (1991, 1993, 1997), Berry and Stangl
(1996), and Simon (1999), as well as ethical critiques of traditional frequentist
trials, e.g., see Kadane (1996). Aside from the actual interpretation of the out-
comes in a Bayesian framework, these and other authors have argued that the
Bayesian approach can provide faster and more useful clinical trial information
in a wide variety of circumstances in comparison with frequentist methodology.
Bayesian designs and analyses are part of an increasing number of premarket
submissions to FDA's Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH). This
initiative, which began in the late 1990s, takes advantage of good prior infor-
mation on safety and eectiveness that is often available for studies of the same
or similar recent generation devices. In 2006, CDRH issued draft guidelines for
the use of Bayesian statistics in clinical trials for medical devices (FDA, 2006)
and these were nalized in 2010 (FDA, 2010). Previous regulatory guidelines have
mentioned Bayesian methods briey, but this was the rst broadly circulated spe-
cic document focusing on Bayesian methodologies. The guidelines do, however,
place considerable onus on the drug companies who wish to present Bayesian
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studies, largely because of justiable concerns over selective use of data from
within studies and the reporting of results.
As the guidelines make clear, Bayesian formulations and methods can improve
the assessment of new drugs and devices by incorporating expert opinion, results
of prior investigations, both experiments and observational studies, and synthe-
sizing results across concurrent studies. There are sections that emphasize the
importance of hierarchical models and the dierent roles for exchangeability, e.g.,
among patients within trials and among trials. We quote from the nal guidelines
on the role of prior information:
We recommend you identify as many sources of good prior information as possible.
The evaluation of \goodness" of the prior information is subjective. Because your
trial will be conducted with the goal of FDA approval of a medical device, you should
present and discuss your choice of prior information with FDA reviewers (clinical,
engineering, and statistical) before your study begins.
Possible sources of prior information include:
 clinical trials conducted overseas.
 patient registries.
 clinical data on very similar products.
 pilot studies.
The guidelines go on:
Prior distributions based directly on data from other studies are the easiest to eval-
uate. While we recognize that two studies are never exactly alike, we nonetheless
recommend the studies used to construct the prior be similar to the current study
in the following aspects:
 protocol (endpoints, target population, etc.), and
 time frame of the data collection (e.g., to ensure that the practice of medicine
and the study populations are comparable)
In some circumstances, it may be helpful if the studies are also similar in investiga-
tors and sites. Include studies that are favorable and non-favorable. Including only
favorable studies creates bias. Bias, based on study selection may be evaluated by:
 the representativeness of the studies that are included, and
 the reasons for including or excluding each study.
Prior distributions based on expert opinion rather than data can be problematic.
Approval of a device could be delayed or jeopardized if FDA advisory panel members
or other clinical evaluators do not agree with the opinions used to generate the prior.
(pp. 22{23)
The FDA guidelines include examples of Bayesian studies that have met agency
review standards. Two examples given in the guidelines are:
Example 1: T-Scan 1 T-scan 2000 is a device to be used as an adjunct to
mammography for patients with equivocal results. The FDA was presented
with an intended use study of 74 consecutive biopsies in Italy. The company
combined the results with those from a prospective double blind study at
7 centers compared T-scan to T-scan plus mammography for 504 patients,
and the those from a targeted study of 657 biopsy cases at 2 centers in Is-
rael using a Bayesian multinomial logistic model. It was able to demonstrate
eectiveness in intended use context where there was insucient informa-
tion to demonstrate eectiveness. The prior was chosen to smooth the zero
counts but to be relatively diuse. The device was approved for this use as
a consequence in 1999.
1http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfTopic/pma/pma.cfm?num=p970033
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Example 2: Inter Fix 2 Inter Fix is an implant device for spinal fusion proce-
dure for patients with degenerative disc disease and back pain. There were
data available for 139 patients in randomized clinical trial, with 77 treated
and 62 controls. There were also 104 non-randomized subjects treated. An
interim analysis was performed based on a Bayesian predictive model for
the future success rate of the device, although most of the other analyses
reported appear to be frequentist in nature. The device was approved in
1999 as well.
CDRH statisticians have been exploring and lecturing on important lessons learned
in the course of the Bayesian initiative for the design, conduct, and analysis of
medical devices studies such as the two outlined here.
Although the two studies described above made use of the pooling of evidence,
in many ways the key benet of Bayesian methods is the ability it oers to change
the study's course when the welfare of subjects is at stake|using what is known
as adaptive randomization. As Don Berry has argued:
In a multiyear frequentist study, new patients will have the same chance of being
enrolled in either group, regardless of whether the new or old drug is performing
better. This approach can put patients at a disadvantage. A Bayesian model, on the
other hand, can periodically show researchers that one arm is outperforming the
other and then put more new volunteers into the better arm. (Don Berry quoted in
Beckman, 2006)
As is the case in other applications, at the FDA the main criticism of the Bayesian
approach is the diculty associated with the choice of the prior. Spiegelhalter et
al. (1994) stress the use of dierent forms of priors such as reference priors,
\clinical" priors, \skeptical" priors, and enthusiastic priors. The FDA guidelines
clearly argue against \subjective" expert opinion, but as we know from other
settings the likelihood function is often at least as subjective as is the prior and
hierarchical Bayesian structures impose substantial constraints on the prior and
thus the posterior even when one uses \diuse" distributions on the parameters at
the highest levels of the hierarchy! Moreover, when one is drawing upon previous
studies, there is always an issue of how much \weight" these should receive in
the prior, especially if the previous studies did not involve randomization as in
Example 2 above.
Unfortunately, as these ideas move to other parts of the FDA they are not
without controversy. While we were completing this paper, a new controversy over
a specic drug made news. Vasogen Inc. announced that on Friday, March 14, 2008
it had an initial teleconference with the FDA to discuss and clarify the recent FDA
comments regarding the use of a Bayesian approach for ACCLAIM II, a clinical
trial which is being planned to support an application for U.S. market approval
of the CelacadeTMSystem for the treatment of patients with New York Heart
Association Class II heart failure.3 Oversight of the drug approval had shifted
from CDRH|which had issued the guidelines for use of Bayesian methods|
to the FDA Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), which has
adopted a far more cautious approach. How such issues will work themselves out
remains to be seen.
Another place at the FDA where Bayesian methodology has recently come into
vogue is in the post-approval surveillance of drugs and devices, especially with
2http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfTopic/pma/pma.cfm?num=p970015
3\FDA deals blow to Vasogen's heart treatment," Reuters, Mar 3, 2008.
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regard to side eects. DuMouchel (1999) discusses hierarchical Bayesian models
for analyzing a very large frequency table that cross-classies adverse events by
type of drug used. Madigan et al. (2010) describes a more elaborate, large-scale
approach to the analysis of adverse event data gathered via spontaneous reporting
systems linked to claims databases.
It is worth noting that Bayesian methods have been used in innovative ways
to study the combination of evidence across studies on matters directly before
the FDA. On the advice of an expert panel, the FDA in 2004 put a \black-box"
warning|its highest warning level|on antidepressants for pediatric use espe-
cially among teenagers. The panel's advice was based not on actual suicides, but
on indications that suicidal thoughts and behaviors increased in some children
and teens taking newer selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) type an-
tidepressants. Kaizar et al. (2006) later addressed the combination of evidence
using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analytical approach. They concluded that the
evidence supporting a causal link between SSRI-type antidepressant use and sui-
cidality in children is weak. This will clearly be evidence that the FDA will need
to consider when it next reviews this issue, as it surely will, because of subsequent
observational studies that suggest teen suicides have increased considerably de-
spite a substantial decrease in the use of antidepressants, e.g., see Gibbons et al.
(2007).
Finally we note the extensive applications of a range of Bayesian methods in
the related matters of health technology assessment as described by Spiegelhalter
et al. (2000) and Spiegelhalter (2004).
6. CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE RISK-UTILITY TRADEOFF
Protecting the condentiality of data provided by individuals and establish-
ments has been and continues to be a major preoccupation of statistical agencies
around the world. Over the past 30 years, statisticians within and outside a
number of major agencies have worked to cast the condentiality problem as
a statistical one, and over the past decade this eort has taken on substantial
Bayesian overtones as the focus has shifted to the tradeo between risk associated
with protection of condentiality and the utility of databases for dierent kinds
of statistical analyses. See the papers in Doyle et al. (2001) for a broad review of
the literature as it stood about a decade ago.
Some of the earlier condentiality literature focused on the protection of data
against intruders or \data snoopers" and Fienberg, Makov, and Sanil (1997)
proposed modeling intruder behavior (and thus protection against it) using a
subjective Bayesian \matching" model, c.f. the discussion of Bayesian \matching"
methods in D'Orazio et al. (2006). In 2001, Duncan et al. suggested a Bayesian
approach to the risk-ultility tradeo problem, which was later generalized in the
context of a formal statistical decision theory model by Trottini and Fienberg
(2002) and implemented in illustrative form by Dobra, Fienberg, and Trottini
(2003) in the context of protecting categorical databases.
More recently, Ting, Fienberg, and Trottini (2008) contrasted their method of
random orthogonal matrix masking with other microdata perturbation methods,
such as additive noise, from the Bayesian perspective of the tradeo between dis-
closure risk and data utility. This work has yet to be adopted by statistical agen-
cies, but related Bayesian modeling in the same spirit by Franconi and Stander
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(2002), Polettini and Stander (2004), Rinott and Shlomo (2007), and Forster and
Webb (2007) has been done in close collaboration with those in agencies in Israel,
Italy, and the United Kingdom.
One other Bayesian approach to condentiality protection which has already
seen successful penetration into U.S. statistical agencies is based on the method
of multiple imputation approach due originally to Donald Rubin and proposed
by him for application in the context of protecting condentiality in 1993. See
Fienberg, Makov, and Steele (1998) for a related proposal. The basic idea is
simple although the details of the implementation can be complex. We want to
replace the actual condential data by simulated data drawn from the posterior
distribution of a model that captures the relationships among the variables to
be released. Since these \sampled units" are synthetic and do not actually cor-
respond to original sample members, proponents claim that the resulting data
protect condentiality by denition|others point out that synthetic people may
be close enough to \real" sample members for there still to be problems of pos-
sible re-identication. The method of multiple imputation allows one to generate
multiple synthetic (imputed) samples from the posterior and to use these samples
to produce estimates of variability that have a frequentist interpretation. Raghu-
nathan, Reiter, and Rubin (2003) and a number of subsequent papers describe
the formalisms of the methodology as well as extensions involving only partially
imputed data. Because statistical agencies in the U.S. were already experimenting
with multiple imputation to deal with missing value problems, a number of them
have recently experimented with this technology for condentiality protection as
well. Since the methodology work for fairly general classes of prior distributions
it could utilize, at least in principle, prior information from multiple sources as
well as expert judgment.
7. CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS ABATEMENT
By now there is hardly a literate person who has not heard about global warm-
ing and the dire consequences predicted if we do not change our behavior regard-
ing the emission of greenhouse gases and aerosols. The following statements are
typical and come from a report to the U.S. Senate by Thomas Karl (2001), a
senior ocial in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
 The natural \greenhouse" eect is real, and is an essential component of
the planet's climate process.
 Some greenhouse gases are increasing in the atmosphere because of human
activities and increasingly trapping more heat.
 The increase in heat-trapping greenhouse gases due to human activities
are projected to be amplied by feedback eects, such as changes in water
vapor, snow cover, and sea ice.
 Particles (or aerosols) in the atmosphere resulting from human activities
can also aect climate.
 There is a growing set of observations that yields a collective picture of a
warming world over the past century.
 It is likely that the frequency of heavy and extreme precipitation events has
increased as global temperatures have risen.
 Scenarios of future human activities indicate continued changes in atmo-
spheric composition throughout the 21st century.
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Fig 1. Smoothed reconstructions of large-scale (Northern Hemisphere mean or global mean)
surface temperature variations from six dierent research teams are shown along with the in-
strumental record of global mean surface temperature. Source: National Research Council (2006).
These and similar conclusions have been shared with the public by the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences{National Research Council through a series of committee reports. Many
of the statements are backed up by elaborate statistical assessments and modeling
and over the past decade this work has taken on an increasingly Bayesian avor.
There have also been challenges to many of these statements, despite what the
\global warming" proponents describe as increasingly strong empirical support.
See for example Wegman, Scott, and Said (2006) for a statistical critique of some
recent modeling eorts.
In Figure 1 we reproduce an example of the temperature reconstruction for
the past 2000 years based on multiple sources prepared by a panel from the Na-
tional Research Council (2006). One thing that is obvious from this gure is the
convergence of the data sources for the past 150 years, from the start of the indus-
trial revolution, showing temperatures increasing substantially throughout recent
times|this is global warming! What is also clear is the uncertainty associated
with these reconstructions going back further in time|this is indicated by the
shading in the background of the gure, with darkness associated with greater
uncertainty, c.f., Chu (2005).
The precise trajectory of the recent increases in temperature clearly has sub-
stantial uncertainty across the data sources and models and it would surprise few
of us to learn that projections from these data can vary dramatically. This has
recently been the focus of intensive Bayesian analysis by a number of authors
around the world, e.g., Min and Hense (2006, 2007), and especially work in the
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United States by Berliner et al. (2000), Tebaldi et al. (2005), and Sanso, Forest,
and Zantedeschi (2008).
Tebaldi, Smith, and Sans o (2010) describe a way to combine an ensemble of
computer simulation model results and projections and actual observations via
hierarchical modeling in order to derive posterior probabilities of temperature
and precipitation change at regional scale. They consider the ensemble of com-
puter models as being drawn from a superpopulation of such models, and use
use hierarchical Bayesian models to combine results and compute the posterior
predictive distribution for a new climate model's projections along with the un-
certainty to be associated with them. For a related discussion about assessing the
uncertainties of projections, see Chandler et al. (2010).
Whether in the context of this work, or in many other eorts to forecast fu-
ture temperatures, Bayesian and non-Bayesian, almost all modeling eorts agree
that temperatures will continue to rise. Where the principal disagreements come
in is \by how much" and \what would be the impact by various strategies for
abatement."
It is worth noting that subjective Bayesian methods were proposed for use
in climate modeling as early as 1997 by Hobbs and the prominence of Bayesian
arguments is due not only to statisticians working in this area but also to climate
modeling specialists such as Schneider (2000), who has noted:
For three decades, I have been debating alternative solutions for sustainable devel-
opment with thousands of fellow scientists and policy analysts|exchanges carried
out in myriad articles and formal meetings. Despite all that, I readily confess a lin-
gering frustration: uncertainties so infuse the issue of climate change that it is still
impossible to rule out either mild or catastrophic outcomes, let alone provide con-
dent probabilities for all the claims and counterclaims made about environmental
problems.
Even the most credible international assessment body, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), has refused to attempt subjective probabilistic esti-
mates of future temperatures. This has forced politicians to make their own guesses
about the likelihood of various degrees of global warming. Will temperatures in 2100
increase by 1.4 degrees Celsius or by 5.8? The dierence means relatively adaptable
changes or very damaging ones. :::
So what then is \the real state of the world"? Clearly, it isn't knowable in traditional
statistical terms, even though subjective estimates can be responsibly oered. The
ranges presented by the IPCC in its peer-reviewed reports give the best snapshot of
the real state of climate change: we could be lucky and see a mild eect or unlucky
and get the catastrophic outcomes.
The IPCC assessment builds on formal and informal use of subjective assessments
of the evidence. There is in fact now a tradition in this eld of expert elicitation of
expert judgments, e.g., see Morgan and Keith (1995), Keith (1996), and Zickeld
et al. (2007).
8. DISABILITY AMONG THE ELDERLY
In the United States, there are no ocial government surveys of disability
and how it is changing over time, but the National Institute on Aging (NIA)
has funded, with support of other government agencies, two major longitudinal
surveys that capture information on disability and link it to other data|the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and the National Long Term Care Survey
(NLTCS). The original cohort for the NLTCS was surveyed in 1982 and there have
been subsequent waves in 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004. The NLTCS has been
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managed by a university based organization since the late 1980s, but actual data
collection has been carried out by the U.S. Census Bureau. Considerable interest
in the NLTCS has focused on a series of measures of disability know as \Activities
of Daily Living" (ADLs) and \Instrumental Activities of Daily Living" (IADLs),
especially for those in the sample exhibiting some dimension of disability on
a screener question. Erosheva, Fienberg, and Joutard (2007) studied a cross-
sectional version of 16 binary ADLs and IADLs, represented in the form of a 216
contingency table using a Bayesian latent variable model that was developed to be
an analogue to the frequentist Grade of Membership (GoM) model of Manton,
Woodbury and Tolley (1994), the likelihood function for which is notoriously
problematic.
The Bayesian version of the GoM model utilizes hierarchical modeling ideas
through a layered latent variable structure. Let x = (x1;x2;:::;xJ) be a vector
of binary manifest variables. The GoM model is structured around K mixture
components (extreme proles), and it assigns to each individual a latent par-
tial membership vector of K nonnegative random variables, g = (g1;g2;:::;gK),
whose components sum to 1. By assigning a distribution D(g) to the vector g and
integrating, we obtain the marginal distribution for individual response patterns
in the form of an individual-level mixtures. Erosheva, Fienberg, and Joutard ex-
plain how to t this Bayesian GoM model using MCMC techniques and apply
it to the data in the 216 contingency table displaying outcomes on the 16 ADLs
and IADLs, treating these dierent measures of disability as exchangeable, and
thus as if they were independent and drawn from another common distribution.
Airoldi et al. (2007, 2010) explore related aspects of model specication and
model choice. As with a number of the earlier examples the hierarchical latent
structure embedded in this modeling approach is a mechanism for gaining con-
trol over what might otherwise be an unmanageable number of parameters and
essential to the success of the related methods.
This work on disability opens the door to a number of challenging problems
for the Bayesian modeling community. For example:
 How should a Bayesian working with hierarchical models such as the Bayesian
GoM model incorporate the survey weights that arise from the sampling
scheme of the survey and adjustments for nonresponse? There is now an
extensive literature that provides conicting advice on the use of survey
weights in the Bayesian framework, but the hierarchical model complexi-
ties bring these issues into somewhat sharper focus in this setting, e.g., see
the contrasting arguments in Fienberg (2009) and Little (2009).
 Manrique-Vallier and Fienberg (2010) extend these ideas to longitudinal
latent proles applied to the 6 ADLs measured across all 6 waves of the
survey, and Manrique-Vallier (2010) adds in survival and generational ef-
fects to address the question of whether disability is increasing or decreasing
over time. He appears to able to capture characteristics that others have
addressed using comparisons across cross-sections for each wave of the sur-
vey, see e.g., Manton and Gu (2001) and Manton, Gu, and Lamb (2006).
Scaling these methods up to the full array of ADLs and IADLs with key
covariates remains a major challenge. This is a matter of considerable inter-
est to policy planners who are interested in forecasting future demands on
the health-care infrastructure as a result of changes in long-term disability
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over time.
The Bayesian GoM model is a special case of a much larger class of mixed
membership models that can be used to analyze a diverse array of data types
ranging from text in documents to images, to linkages in networks, and lon-
gitudinal versions may prove applicable in other settings beyond the study of
disability.
9. CONCLUSION
For much of the twentieth century, approaches to the design and analysis of
statistical studies in government settings and public policy were almost exclu-
sively descriptive or dominated by the frequentist approach that followed from
the work of Fisher and from Neyman and Pearson. With the neo-Bayesian re-
vival of the 1950s, Bayesian methods and techniques slowly began to appear in
the public arena, and their use has accelerated dramatically during the past two
decades, especially with the rise of MCMC methods that have allowed for the
sampling from posterior distributions in settings involving very large data sets.
In this paper, we have attempted to give some examples, both old and new,
of Bayesian methods in statistical practice in government and public policy set-
tings and to suggest why in most of the cases there was ultimately little or no
resistance to the Bayesian approach. Our examples have included censustaking
and small area estimation, U.S. election night forecasting, studies reported to
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, assessing global climate change, and
measuring declines in disability among the elderly. Their diversity suggests that
there is growing recognition of the value of Bayesian results, and a realization
that the approach deals directly with questions of substantive interest.
Where there has been controversy, it has largely focused on the role of the
choice of prior distributions and the appropriateness of \borrowing strength"
across geographic boundaries. Arguments in favor of the use of \objective" priors
have done little to stem the frequentist criticism of Bayesian methods, and typ-
ically ignore the highly subjective aspects of elements on hierarchical structures
and likelihood functions. Through the examples discussed here, we have tried to
convey the fact that a pragmatic Bayesian approach inevitably includes many
subjective elements, although prior distributions may well draw on data from
related settings and have an empirical avor to them. Nonetheless, the princi-
pal challenge to Bayesian methods that remains is need to constantly rebut the
notion that frequentist are \objective" and thus more appropriate for use in the
public domain.
In other areas of statistical application Bayesian methodology has also seen a
major resurgence and this is especially true in connection with machine learn-
ing approaches to very large data sets, where the use of hierarchically-structured
latent variable models is essential to generating high quality estimates and pre-
dictions.
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